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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
GERARD C. SMITH*
I would like to present some views on nuclear "arms control," and
in that term I include limitations on weapons, and on their use-as
well as curbs on their spread around the world.
I
As the literature becomes flooded with acronyms like SALT,
START, CTB, NPT, IAEA and LTB, it is sometimes forgotten that
the United States and the U.S.S.R., as well as other nations, are en-
gaged in a drawn-out process of international law-making by treaty
and other agreements, tacit as well as explicit, to control arms-and
the record is not all that bad.
In 1972 it appeared as though this process would result in the es-
tablishment of a broadly based rule of law for the control of nuclear
weapons. A limited test ban treaty' was in effect, putting an end to
Soviet and American nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space
and underwater-a significant environmental anti-pollution measure, if
not an effective limitation on nuclear weapons design. A treaty demili-
tarized the Antarctic continent2 and provided for international inspec-
tion there, which had repeatedly taken place. A special communica-
tions link, the "Hot Line," was set up, and it had proven its worth in
times of crises. A treaty banning weapons of mass destruction in space
or their installation on celestial bodies8 had been in effect for some
time. A treaty setting up a nuclear weapons free zone in Latin
America' had received broad, if not total, support and a treaty banning
* Former Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Chief of
the SALT I Delegation.
1. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, opened for signature Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43.
2. Antarctic Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
4. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, opened for sig-
nature Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281.
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nuclear weapons on the seabeds was approved in 1971.'
Finally, SALT I had been ratified, limiting one-half of the Soviet-
American competition in ballistic missiles to a very low ceiling of one
hundred ABM launchers. 6 By this limitation, the American deterrent
had been immensely strengthened since it ended the prospect that So-
viet defensive systems would be able to stop our missiles from hitting
targets in the U.S.S.R. This treaty, the great prize of SALT I, is now in
some jeopardy as weaponeers press for ABM defenses for our land-
based missiles. SALT I also placed a freeze on the number of offensive
missile launchers-both land and sea based. It is still honored, al-
though, by its terms, it expired some five years ago.
II
Two developments in SALT I should be of interest to lawyers.
Before that negotiation, it was not clear how the Soviets would view
space satellite operations. After they had shot down a U-2 photo-
graphic reconnaissance plane, Krushchev aborted a summit meeting
with President Eisenhower. Would photography from space be legally
different, in their view, from that taken from the atmosphere? The
SALT ABM Treaty, in effect, legitimized, some would say mandated,
the use of what are euphemistically called "national technical means of
verification." Article XII, section 1 reads: "For the purpose of provid-
ing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each
party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal
in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of interna-
tional law."'7 In section 2, the parties went so far as to agree not to
interfere with intelligence operations needed for verification.8 In sec-
tion 3, they agreed not to impede these operations by concealment
measures.' In the annals of espionage there has never been such a for-
mal, explicit endorsement of spying.
We realized that, in a novel field like strategic arms control, ques-
tions of treaty fulfillment were bound to arise. Accordingly, in article
XIII, the Standing Consultative Committee was established to consider
compliance questions. 10 I have been told by officials charged with the
5. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, opened for signature Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337.
6. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United
States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503.
7. Id. art. XII.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. art. XIII.
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operations of the SCC that it is fulfilling its purpose. They claim that
possible violations and ambiguities have been satisfactorily resolved. In
addition, three Presidents have certified in writing that the provisions
of SALT I are being carried out."
III
To my mind, the most important objective of arms control is the
curbing of nuclear weapons proliferation. The greater risk of nuclear
war lies in its origination, not from a Soviet-American crisis in the first
instance, but from some confrontation in the now proliferating Third
World. The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1969 (NPT)2 went a long way
toward creating nuclear free zones in parts of the world. This treaty is
the central juridical structure supporting hopes that the cancerous
spread of nuclear weapons can be stopped. Some important nations
continue to reject it, however, notably India, Pakistan, Israel, South
Africa, Brazil and Argentina.
The Non-Proliferation Treaty centers on a basic bargain which
was explicitly recognized in the preamble to SALT I. Under article II
of the NPT, in consideration of the agreement by the superpowers to
negotiate for control of their arms and eventual disarmament, the non-
weapons signatory nations agreed not to acquire them." Less than
three years after the treaty was ratified, SALT I was concluded, and it
appeared that the NPT was on solid ground. But no subsequent nu-
clear arms treaty has been ratified. At the 1980 Review Conference of
the NPT, a number of non-nuclear nations questioned whether there
had been a failure of consideration.1 4 The next review conference is
only three years away. If no progress on strategic arms control is made
by then, we face the possibility of nations defecting from the NPT.
This danger alone should give sharp urgency to efforts to get on with
arms control-an urgency seemingly absent from the Reagan adminis-
tration's concept of an appropriate tempo for negotiations, now called
"START."
11. See 124 CONG. REC. S4961 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1978) (statement of Sen. Sparkman)
which states that "[tlhree successive Presidents of the United States have been ap-
praised in detail as to Soviet compliance with SALT I, and, significantly, none has seen
cause in a single instance to charge the Soviet Union with violating the terms of the
SALT I agreement."
12. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July
1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
13. Id. art. II.
14. See generally The Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, [1980] 5 U.N. DIsARMAMENr Y.B. 126, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF IH/22 (the final document of the Second Review Conference).
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The NPT was preceded and supplemented by an institution, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that has a membership
of more than one hundred nations. The IAEA has two functions: to
promote the spread of peaceful nuclear technology, equipment and ma-
terial; and to inspect nuclear facilities around the world in order to
deter the diversion of fissionable material to military uses.' 5 Although
its inspection system has been criticized for being ineffective, especially
by Israel which demonstrated its doubts by bombing an Iraqi nuclear
plant in 1981, the IAEA system is considered by the United States to
be the best available and much more efficient than any system which
could now be negotiated. Along with the NPT, it constitutes a modest
contribution to a rule of law in this sensitive area where the line be-
tween energy requirements and military potential becomes blurred.
One unfortunate consequence of the Lebanon crisis is that the United
States is now boycotting this agency because it has excluded Israel
from its general conference.
The NPT and the IAEA alone, however, are insufficient to guard
against the dire threat of proliferation. The major nuclear nations must
further coordinate their export policies and employ their political in-
fluence in a much greater effort to try to isolate any nation which de-
velops or acquires nuclear weapons. Preventing the further spread of
nuclear weapons and fulfilling their part of the basic bargain struck in
the NPT by achieving meaningful nuclear weapons controls are the
sharpest challenges facing American and Soviet capabilities to cooper-
ate to save the world.
IV
What happened to hinder this process of nuclear weapons control?
The SALT process slowly continued, but during the 1970's the great
expectations for the easing of tensions that were supposed to have ac-
companied SALT I were disappointed. The Soviets pushed ahead vig-
orously with strategic arms programs and some Americans felt that, by
doing so, they violated the spirit of SALT I. To my mind, arms control
agreements should be recognized as arrangements between adversaries.
Their provisions should be clearly spelled out; nothing should be left to
unilateral interpretation or "spirit." Contrary to some thinking, the
United States in these years also embarked on major modernization
programs involving land, sea and air forces of the strategic triad. We
are proceeding with these programs, and although we have a substan-
tial lead in warheads, their production is to be increased.
15. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, art. III, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
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After seven years of negotiations during which Soviet-American
relations deteriorated, the second SALT Treaty (SALT II) was signed
in the Spring of 1979,10 but by December the prospects for Senate con-
sent seemed so unsure that the Carter administration quickly grasped
the opportunity offered by the Afghan invasion to cease pressing for
Senate action. The 1980 political campaign made an issue of the al-
leged fatal flaws in this treaty, and it now remains unratified.
V
In place of SALT II, the new Administration talked of measures
aimed at restoring American strategic superiority. It was recognized
that public opinion here and abroad required that negotiations to limit
strategic arms be continued, but the Administration felt that the tim-
ing of these negotiations should be deferred until appropriations for
the new defense measures had been secured. There was also talk that,
when negotiations started, the American opening positions should be
maintained and not eroded by concessions; that the perceived vulnera-
bility of the United States ICBMs should be remedied as quickly as
possible, either by new deployments, by agreement with the U.S.S.R.,
or by both; and that popular opinion should be left in no doubt about
the Soviet's malicious purposes.
The responsibilities of office, however, have made our security
managers realize that this scenario is not realistic. It is almost two
years since the election of President Reagan, and the word "rearm" is
less often heard in Washington although the cries for higher defense
budgets remain. The word "freeze" is more current. Nuclear policy is
becoming democratized, and it has penetrated deeply into the religious
consciousness of millions of Americans.
Official statements have renounced strategic superiority as an aim.
The Secretary of Defense recently denied that the United States en-
dorses the concept of protracted nuclear war or nuclear "warfight-
ing. '" 7 He is even reported to have said that he had no idea whether it
would be possible to control nuclear forces in the confusion of a pro-
tracted nuclear war.'8 Vulnerability of land-based missiles remains a
concern, but the chief remedy, an invulnerable method of basing
ICBMs, seems as far away as ever. The start of negotiations with the
U.S.S.R. seems to have been more a matter of responding to public
16. SALT II, signed June 18, 1979 (not entered into force), reprinted in S. ExEc.
Doc. No. Y, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 37-45.
17. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1982, at A8, col. 1.
18. Id.
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opinion than of deciding that newly acquired positions of strength war-
rant a start.
The Reagan administration still appears to have less interest in a
nuclear arms control agreement with the U.S.S.R. than have past ad-
ministrations. It seems to be more at home with a hard-nosed negotiat-
ing posture against a background of a general policy resembling eco-
nomic and psychological cold war.
VI
Accompanied by "bargaining chip" talk, the Administration now
negotiates at two Geneva tables. Although physically separated, they
are inevitably linked. For Europe, we have proposed a complete ban on
intermediate-range missile launchers to be accomplished by the re-
moval of all Soviet launchers of this range and by the termination of
the program to deploy American missiles. Although that proposal
seems to have smothered European demonstrations against the Ameri-
can missiles, I do not expect it to lead to agreement since it would
require complete decommission of all Soviet intermediate-range
missiles.
For the longer range strategic forces, we have proposed an initial
limitation on ballistic missiles. Other systems, such as cruise missiles
and bombers, are left for future negotiation. Our proposal seems in-
tended as a "fix" for the alleged vulnerability of our ICBMs rather
than as a genuine effort either to rectify the alleged defects in the
SALT II Treaty or to arrive at broad new limits on strategic arms.
Since it does not address known Soviet concerns-cruise missiles, for-
ward-based systems and heavy bombers-it seems unlikely to lead
anywhere. But there are rumors of interesting Soviet counter-propos-
als, and it is not inconceivable that the United States is engaged in
genuine and secret negotiations. We must wait and see.
VII
It is generally accepted that arms control agreements can only be
reached when each side calculates that a condition of parity exists.
President Reagan has gone out of his way to declare that the United
States is now, in effect, a second-class nuclear power-a conclusion
with which I respectfully, but wholeheartedly, disagree. This question
of whether we are behind in the nuclear competition is of central im-
portance. If we are behind, the current effort to negotiate in START
would be either a cover to provide time to "catch up," a vain effort to
persuade the Soviets to concede more than we, or a dangerous process
of bargaining from a position of weakness. I think that we are not be-
[Vol. 4
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
hind, that we are not a second-class nuclear power and that we pres-
ently possess ample bargaining power to assure a fair outcome of a gen-
uine negotiation. I am not sure that we are, as yet, engaged in one.
President Reagan's views would place the impossible burden of re-
storing a condition of strategic equality on any arms control negotia-
tion. When we were ahead, it would have been inconceivable that we
would have entered into such an unequal treaty, or if we had, that the
Senate would have consented. The Administration must recognize this
obvious fact. Its main interest, therefore, seems less in arms control
and more in armaments now with controls later-perhaps. But the Ad-
ministration does see a use for past arms controls. SALT II, which was
labeled "fatally flawed," is to be respected. That treaty calls for re-
straints on Soviet forces, which the Administration would like to see
maintained as we modernize our forces. We, therefore, have a peculiar
legal situation: The United States will not agree to be formally bound
by SALT II, but, in the hope of keeping the Soviets bound, we have
declared that we will not "undercut" its provisions as long as the Sovi-
ets do not.
VIII
Americans quite properly focus on the issue of arms control by
asking: "Can you trust the Russians?" I would say, trust them only to
do what seems to be in their national interest and nothing more. I
sometimes wonder if the Soviets ask themselves a similar question.
What does the record look like? While not forgetting that Soviet con-
duct has been bad, especially in Afghanistan and Poland, it might be
useful to consider what the impact on Americans would have been if
Soviet arms control conduct had been similar to ours in recent years.
What if after seven years of SALT concessions and counter-con-
cessions a treaty had been signed, and the Soviets refused to ratify it,
proposing instead to start a new negotiation? What if after long negoti-
ations the parties had signed treaties limiting nuclear tests, but the
Soviets refused to ratify them and, instead, proposed further negotia-
tion? What if both sides had been negotiating a comprehensive test
ban for a decade, and with few issues remaining, the Soviets refused to
continue? What if after negotiating for controls over anti-satellite
weapons systems the U.S.S.R. decided not to proceed? What if the So-
viets paralleled arms control negotiations with economic pressures
against the United States?
Some responsible Americans would say that you cannot work with
a country that does not believe in the norms of the United Nations
charter; that may be using biological and chemical weapons contrary to
agreements; that is engaged in direct aggression in Afghanistan and in-
19831
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direct aggression in Poland; and that is stirring up trouble with the
help of surrogates in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.
But the cold fact is that nuclear weapons have placed both super-
powers in a common dilemma. Escape from this dilemma should take
precedence over other considerations. Building more weapons hardly
seems a safe escape route. Nuclear arms control becomes all the more
urgent precisely because the Soviets do not behave as we would prefer.
Like it or not, we have no realistic alternative other than to try to
cooperate with the U.S.S.R. to reduce nuclear war risks through verifi-
able agreements.
Ix
The ultimate aim of nuclear arms control is to reduce the risk that
the weapons will ever be fired. That risk may be manageable if a secure
deterrent to war can be maintained. Popular confidence in the deter-
rent has waned recently in Europe. While NATO non-nuclear forces
are admittedly inadequate, the margin of Warsaw Pact superiority is
much less than many observers assume. Reliance on nuclear weapons
to compensate for this relative weakness is a dangerous business-a
nuclear thralldom from which the alliance should escape as soon as
feasible.
Bob McNamara, George Kennan, Mac Bundy and I, also known as
the "Gang of Four," doubting that Europe can be defended in a nu-
clear war, have proposed reexamination of our present strategy of
starting nuclear hostilities if conventional forces were unable to halt a
Soviet non-nuclear attack.1 This proposal has been subject to criti-
cisms ranging from claims that NATO cannot afford sufficient conven-
tional forces to charges that giving up the nuclear threat would make
war more likely. The Administration and the governments in Europe
are not interested in reexamining our present strategy. They judge that
such a change of strategy (or even its examination) would prejudice
NATO's deterrent posture.
A recent Soviet unilateral pledge to the United Nations not to be
the first to use nuclear weapons 0 has been dismissed summarily as
without significance. One senses that our officials might have preferred
that the Soviets had not made this pledge. Of course it is not to be
relied upon, but surely it has political significance around the world. It
19. See Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic
Alliance, 60 FOREIGN AN?. 753 (1982).
20. See excerpts of a speech delivered by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to




does make our insistence on a first-use strategy more difficult. It would
seem, however, to inhibit the Soviet Union's freedom to blackmail us
with an implied threat of a preemptive attack on our land-based mis-
siles, the fear of which has been the driving force behind much of our
strategic programs as well as our arms control proposals in START.
The Soviet declaration hardly seems consistent with a policy of nuclear
adventurism about which our officials are properly concerned.
The "Gang of Four" proposal has generated a good deal of interest
in private circles-a number of studies are in progress. The yeast is
working.
x
It is no simple matter to reach a realistic arms control policy in
1982. The Soviets are still in a dynamic phase of their strategic build-
up. They present an ugly countenance to the world with their aggres-
sion against Afghanistan and their coercion against Poland. The new
Soviet leadership does not hold much promise for positive change.
Charges of violation of biological and chemical weapons constraints
have not yet been met by Soviet offers of clarification. With evidence
of Soviet aggression and uncertainties about their willingness to abide
by certain non-strategic agreements, it is understandable that any
United States administration would be cautious about approaches to
new controls.
Under these conditions what should we do to advance a nuclear
arms rule of law? During the "years" which the President has said
START will take to negotiate, it seems most unlikely that he will ask
formal Senate consent to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty-even
if the campaign carping at the treaty for being "fatally flawed" seems
to have been overtaken by current dependence on this unratified treaty
to keep the Soviets from surging ahead in arms competition. Since the
prospect of our negotiating anything better than SALT II in the fore-
seeable future seems slim, ratification of this treaty should be a persis-
tent long-range goal of American policy. In the meantime we should
continue to honor its provisions.
The impasses reached in recent years by following the treaty route
raise the question of whether further strategic arms limitations should
follow the precedent of the SALT I interim freeze agreement2 ' which
was approved by both houses of Congress. The ABM Treaty" which
21. Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972,
United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504.
22. Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7650.
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headed off a costly, dangerous competition in defensive ballistic mis-
siles should be preserved. Efforts to amend or annul it should be care-
fully watched. Only the most clear-cut advantage to American security
would warrant tinkering with or abandoning this most successful ex-
ample of nuclear weapons control through international law.
The twenty-year search for a comprehensive test ban should be
resumed as soon as conditions permit. Ending Soviet and American
testing would not only tend to freeze the strategic balance, but would
constitute a manifestation of superpower intentions to fulfill article VI
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty23 and would present a high, new hur-
dle to nations tempted to start nuclear weapons programs. I am aware
of the reasons advanced against a comprehensive test ban. I find the
opposite case more persuasive.
In our strategic planning we should recognize that our acquiescing
in NATO's continuing deficiencies in conventional military force in-
volves running an unnecessary risk of war. While modernizing our stra-
tegic forces we should, with our allies, make major new efforts to re-
store the balance in conventional forces in Europe that was fecklessly
abandoned after World War II. It is not too much to say that the road
to nuclear arms control will probably have to be guarded indefinitely
by stronger non-nuclear forces. The prevention of an escalating race in
conventional forces through negotiations such as the Mutual Balanced
Force Reduction talks2 4 should, however, be pursued.
CONCLUSION
Let us hope that the process of genuinely striving for a broadening
of a rule of international law over arms will soon be pressed by our
present security managers. There is no safe stopping point in this
quest.
I believe our descendents will look upon these post-war decades,
and perhaps centuries, as a period of world slavery to nuclear weap-
ons-and upon the coming era as a time of working for their abolition.
Until the abolition of nuclear arms is accomplished, we will continue to
face prospective human sacrifice, not only of individuals, but of the
majority, if not all, of humanity. I cannot expect to see the day when
the end of this nuclear slavery will be in sight, but it is a goal well
worth working toward.
23. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 12, art. VI.
24. See 6 U.N. DISARMAMENT Y.B. 292, U.N. Sales No. E.82.IX.7 (1981).
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